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Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between the level and the distribution of education
and economic development. We contribute to the literature by introducing an interaction term
between the education Gini coefficient and average years of schooling. In a dynamic panel over 55
years and 134 countries we provide, on the one hand, strong evidence that more schooling is good
for growth, but the coefficient is variable and substantially declining in the degree of inequality.
The aggregate benefit to education thus depends on a country’s position in the education distri-
bution. On the other hand, we find a slight transitional increase in education inequality to be
beneficial at a very low average level of schooling, but detrimental for growth at a relatively high
average level. Allowing for the macroeconomic return to education to be heterogeneous with re-
spect to the degree of inequality is therefore paramount in understanding the relationship between
education and development.
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The broad concept of human capital comprises aspects inherent in people, which are - as in the case
of genetic abilities, skills and talent - either given or - as in the case of education, experience and
health - develop over time. In this context education obtained through the formal schooling system
takes on an essential role in linking those two components of human capital. Education is able to
compensate for congenital differences as well as educational gaps arising in early childhood. Equal
access to education therefore helps to secure equality of opportunities.1
The aggregate stock of human capital is considered a key element in the determination of economic
development. This is true for industrialized countries, where human capital is vital for technology-
driven sustainable development and for developing countries, where education is an essential factor
for hauling societies out of poverty. Therefore, neoclassical and endogenous growth theories have
attributed a special role to the stock of human capital in bringing about technological progress through
positive education externalities (Lucas, 1988), idea creation as a basis for innovation (Romer, 1990), or
imitation and adoption (Nelson & Phelps, 1966 and Aghion & Howitt, 1996). These theories suggest
a direct link from the level of human capital to either the level of output (for the case of neoclassical
growth theories), or the change in output (in endogenous growth theories).
The link between education and the aggregate stock of human capital is not straightforward. It
depends on schooling quality and spillovers, related to the distribution of human capital within an
economy. If the individual returns to education are identical across people and diminishing on the
margin (Galor & Moav, 2004), then increasing the education of the less educated would enhance the
stock and the average productivity of human capital. But people may differ both in their inherent
abilities, skills and talents, as well as their capability to develop them over time. Even if people differ,
more equality may lead to an improvement in the return to human capital if the actual distribution is
more unequal than the optimal distribution, in which marginal returns are equalized across people. Or,
as Fan et al. (2001) noted, “if people’s abilities are normally distributed, then a skewed distribution
of education opportunities represents large welfare losses.” The theoretical literature gives ample
evidence for this possibility (Sauer & Zagler, 2012). In particular, Lo´pez et al. (1998) highlight the
imperfect tradability of education, causing marginal products not to be equalized across individuals
and aggregate income to depend not only on the total level but also on the distribution of the respective
asset. It is due to these peculiarities that, in the presence of credit market constraints and human
capital indivisibility, social inheritance of education and/or education externalities, the degree of
human capital inequality negatively affects not only the average stock but also the macro return to
human capital.
1As from now we abstract from other components of human capital and use the notions of human capital and
education interchangeably. Moreover, when talking about education we are always considering education obtained
through the formal schooling system. Even if this seems a substantial abstraction, it is not only necessary due to data
limitations but also reasonable, as formal education is the component of human capital which can be affected most
easily by policy.
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Starting with the influential contribution of Mankiw et al. (1992), numerous works have aimed at
finding empirical support for the theoretically predicted strong relation between human capital and
economic growth. Mankiw et al. (1992) find a significant and positive relationship between economic
growth and human capital accumulation (measured by school enrollment). Due to its perceived
importance, the same human capital variable was used as one of three fixed variables in Sala-i-Martin
(1997a, 1997b). Nonetheless, the author himself reports that human capital had a significant positive
effect on economic growth in only 47% of the four million regressions estimated. In a follow-up study,
using Baysian averaging, Doppelhofer et al. (2004) demonstrate a positive impact of education in 80%
of their cases.
The increasing availability of sound data on aggregate educational attainment2 has enabled many
researchers to confirm empirically the expected positive relation between the average stock of human
capital and income growth. The macroeconomic return to education seems, however, to depend on
institutions (e.g. Pritchett, 2001) and the quality of education systems (e.g. Hanushek & Kim, 1995).
In developing economies in particular, the performance of the education system often depends on the
availability of qualified teachers. Human capital formation may thus differ according to the target
group. In this respect, Hanushek & Woessmann (2012) demonstrate that schooling has a positive but
distinct impact on economic growth, depending on whether it is targeted at basic literates or high
performers.
The distribution of human capital may affect the efficiency of human capital formation, and it may
also lead to a positive (technological) education externality. In our work, we thus aim to demonstrate
that the aggregate marginal benefit to education varies according to the position in the education
distribution. We deviate from the literature outlined above, which postulates a simple effect of ed-
ucation on economic growth, and from the theory that redistribution of human capital by ensuring
that the distribution of the current generation of school graduates is more evenly distributed than
for the retiring generation has only a direct effect on economic performance (e.g. Castello´-Climent,
2010a and Castello´-Climent, 2010b). We thus presume the dominance of an indirect relation, working
through the macroeconomic return to education.
We use Barro and Lee’s (2013) education data set and compute Gini coefficients of educational
attainment for a panel of 134 countries ranging over the period from 1950 to 2005 at five-year in-
tervals. We follow a conventional convergence specification based on the augmented Solow model.
This specification is derived from the theoretical exogenous growth model and states that the rate of
growth of an economy depends on the distance from the steady state. Mankiw et al. (1992) identify
the steady state with investment rates, population growth, and average human capital. We add a
distributional measure for human capital to this conditional convergence specification. Moreover, we
argue that the specification of the relationship between average educational attainment and economic
2See Cohen & Soto (2007), Barro & Lee (2013), Lutz et al. (2008).
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development should allow for a macroeconomic return to education that varies with changes in edu-
cational inequality. By applying the system GMM estimator to linear benchmark equations and an
interactive specification, we find evidence supporting the presumed heterogeneous and indirect rela-
tionship. Robustness of this result is established by introducing a threshold model which tests for
education inequality regimes. As this approach has not been applied in empirical studies so far, it
provides new insight into the mechanics and channels of the link between education, its distribution
and economic development. Moreover, it adds to the extensive empirical literature that deals with
computing reliable estimates of the macroeconomic return to education.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a survey of the theoretical
literature on the relevance of the human capital distribution for schooling quality, institutions and
externalities, thus for economic development. Section 3 summarizes existing empirical evidence. We
describe our data and the methodology in sections 4 and 5. Estimation results are summarized in
section 6. The threshold-estimation model is presented in section 7. Finally, we conclude in section 8.
2 The Role of Human Capital Inequality in Economic Devel-
opment
Economists have long analyzed the relationship between inequality, in particular inequality in income
and economic growth. Whereas early approaches underlined the beneficial nature of inequality for
economic development, the modern perspective (Galor, 2009) stresses the potential of inequality to
curb economic growth.3 In this line of research, besides the distribution of wealth and income,
the distribution of human capital is considered to be an important aspect of the overall degree of
inequality within a society. In this regard, Rehme (2007) presents a model where public education
financed through proportional income taxation affects the distribution of education, which is in turn
the main determinant of the distribution of income.
Some important models of economic development and the distribution of educational attainment
focus on the human capital accumulation channel and highlight the effect of inequality on education
investment decisions and hence on changes in the economy’s income level. Thereby, they are able to
explain persistent differences in educational attainment and income within as well as across countries.
If credit markets are imperfect or fully absent, initial wealth is the only source for financing human
capital accumulation and the poor are constrained in their education investment. Inequality in the
initial distribution of wealth therefore adversely affects the division of the population between skilled
and unskilled labor. This, in turn, may hinder a society from achieving its full economic potential,
both in the short run and in the long run (e.g. Galor & Zeira, 1993).
Initial differences in individuals’ socio-economic background also directly translate into heteroge-
neous education investment decisions. Based on strong empirical evidence on the influence of students’
3For good surveys on the literature about the relationship between inequality and growth see Garc´ıa-Penalosa (1994),
Aghion et al. (1999) and more recently Galor (2009).
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socio-economic background in determining educational outcomes, Mej´ıa & St.Pierre (2008) argue that
there are crucial complementary factors in the process of human capital formation that are non-
purchasable in the market.4 Well endowed agents accumulate human capital and provide skilled
labor, whereas the badly equipped choose to supply unskilled labor. Hence, the aggregate outcome
again depends on the share of families with low socio-economic status. Moreover, if individual human
capital is subject to decreasing returns to investment, inequality in the distribution of education im-
pairs the level as well as the average productivity of human capital, thus the level of and growth in
income. This negative relation persists and compounds in the long run through the intergenerational
transmission of education within families as well as amplifying relations between education and fertil-
ity choices (e.g. Moav, 2005; de la Croix & Doepke, 2003) and/or life expectancy (e.g. Castello´-Climent
& Dome´nech, 2008).
The models presented by now are based on the assumptions that education is solely funded privately
and that education quality is homogeneous. The political economy approach to the macroeconomic
effects of human capital inequality accounts for the possibility that publicly provided education is
able to mitigate the adverse effect of education inequality to some extent. But it introduces another
dimension of heterogeneity as initial diversity leads to different education regimes, associated with a
differing efficacy of education in the formation of human capital. In this context, the effect of education
inequality on economic outcomes is twofold. On the one hand, the more equal the distribution of
education, the higher the average level of human capital, thus the higher the quality of public schooling.
The education distribution is, on the other hand, the basis of a majority voting outcome. The size of
the aggregate marginal benefit to education then depends on the productivity of the chosen schooling
regime (e.g. Glomm & Ravikumar, 1992) or the relative quality of private and public schooling if both
regimes coexist (e.g. Ferreira, 2001). In general, the more equal the distribution of human capital,
the higher the quality of public education and the more beneficial is high-productive private schooling
for a majority of the population. Therefore, consistent with evidence on the quality of education, if
inequality in education is pronounced, schooling quality will be low, so that an extra year of education
will not produce much additional human capital.5
Furthermore, the distribution of human capital also affects the extent to which spillover effects
within broadly educated communities generate positive (technological) externalities. According to
Galor and Tsiddon (1997), only when human capital has a high average level and is fairly equally
4Such factors that complement time and effort in the formation of human capital are family background variables
such as parental education, culture, provision of social connections, installation of preferences and aspiration in children
as well as other factors, e.g. neighborhood and peer effects, distance to schools, and different qualities of books, teachers
and schools, among other things (Mej´ıa & St.Pierre, 2008).
5A similar result can be obtained by introducing education costs (e.g. Garc´ıa-Penalosa, 1993). If it is assumed that
education is a human capital intensive activity, education cost will vary according to the proportion of skilled labor
in the total labor force. On the one hand, in rich and highly educated countries where education is relatively cheap,
inequality reduces the proportion of people who can afford to study and hence impairs growth. On the other hand, in
poor and unequal countries with low levels of average human capital education costs are relatively high. A temporary
increase in the degree of educational inequality allows for a strong decline in education costs which enables more people
to become educated and accelerates growth for some periods.
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distributed will a positive externality bring about interactions that increase everybody’s productivity.
In contrast if the level of human capital is very low, increasing the high quality education at the top
of the distribution is able to assist in building up an infrastructure that is supportive of technological
progress based on innovation, imitation and entrepreneurship.
These theoretical approaches have clear empirical implications. In general they predict a negative
relation between human capital inequality and income growth. Models summarized in the first part
of this section imply that the more unequal the distribution of education, the lower the average stock
of human capital, thus the lower income growth. If it is additionally assumed that individual returns
to education are not homogeneous but are decreasing, the degree of human capital inequality also
adversely affects the average return to education. The models surveyed in the second part provide
insight into the possible channels of this relation. Therein, human capital inequality acts as a proxy
for unobservables such as schooling quality, spillover effects and externalities, which drive the average
level of human capital as well as income growth. Both strands of the theoretical literature imply
that human capital inequality is indirectly related to income growth through its effect on the average
return to education.
Overall, we expect the macroeconomic return to average education to be small if human capital
is relatively unequally distributed. The more equal the distribution of human capital, the greater
are spillover effects and technological externalities, thus the higher the aggregate marginal benefit to
education. Also, if the level of human capital is very low, a positive but temporary relation between
education inequality and income growth might be seen if an increase in the degree of inequality helps to
raise school quality by increasing the stock of qualified teachers. This clearly suggests that the separate
inclusion of human capital and its distribution does not fully capture the heterogeneous nature of this
relationship. Also, Rehme (2007) suggests that “conventional growth regressions with human capital
and inequality as regressors may miss the richness of the underlying nonlinearities.”6 We therefore
propose the introduction of an interaction term between human capital and its distribution to test
the above theories.
3 Related Empirical Literature
Empirical research on the relationship between the distribution of education and economic performance
follows two directions. One line of research considers the distribution of education as an omitted
variable in conventional growth regressions, whose inclusion should deliver more reliable estimates
of the macro return to education. Lo´pez et al. (1998) use average schooling as well as the standard
deviation of educational attainment as explanatory variables in a GDP per capita regression. By
applying fixed effects estimation to a panel of 12 Asian and Latin American countries covering the
period from 1970 to 1994, they find a higher degree of inequality in the distribution of education
6As the income inequality in Rehme (2007) depends on the inequality in education, our empirical estimation may
provide further evidence for this claim, already tested in Rehme (2003).
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to be significantly negatively related to GDP per capita. Controlling for distributional aspects as
well as for non-linearities reveals the macro return to average schooling to be most pronounced and
significant. Fan et al. (2001) include the education Gini index in growth regressions. By using fixed
as well as random effects estimation in a panel of 85 countries ranging from 1960 to 1990, they find
a significantly negative relation between the degree of inequality in the distribution of educational
attainment and per capita PPP GDP increments. In a separate regression, the effect of average years
of schooling on income is significantly positive. However, if both schooling variables are included in
one regression equation, the return to average educational attainment remains positive and significant,
but the education Gini turns insignificant, indicating average human capital as an important channel
linking inequality and growth.
Another line of research aims at revealing the relationship between the general concept of inequality
and economic development. Birdsall & Lodon˜o (1997) hypothesize that the rising degree of inequality
in educational attainment in Latin American countries hinders poverty reduction directly as well as
indirectly through its effect on growth. For a sample of 43 economies, they find the standard deviation
of educational attainment to be negatively associated with long-term growth in the respective region.
Castello´ & Dome´nech (2002) compute Gini indices of human capital for 108 countries from 1960
to 2000, based on the Barro and Lee dataset (2000) on educational attainment. In order to deepen
insight into the relation between inequality and economic development they use the initial level of their
inequality measure in a reduced-form equation with average growth in per capita income from 1960
to 1990, depending on initial income and average accumulation rates of human and physical capital.
All their specifications reveal a significantly negative relationship between educational inequality and
growth. Furthermore, by using physical capital accumulation as the dependent variable they show
that educational inequality is also indirectly related to economic growth through the accumulation of
factors. In their subsequent works (Castello´-Climent & Dome´nech, 2008 and Castello´-Climent, 2010a),
the authors provide evidence for demographic channels, i.e. education differentials in fertility and life-
expectancy, to be the most relevant mechanisms in linking inequality, human capital accumulation
and growth.
In her substantial empirical research on inequality and economic development, Castello´-Climent
(2010a, 2010b) succeeds in verifying the strong negative relation between human capital inequality
and income growth, observed in previous cross-section regressions, by estimating a dynamic panel data
model that allows for fixed effects as well as persistent and endogenous regressors. Furthermore, the
author’s findings suggest that the effect of human capital inequality differs across countries according
to the level of development. While the relationship between the education Gini coefficient and the
per capita income growth rate is significantly negative in low- and middle-income countries, it loses
significance in higher-income countries. According to Castello´-Climent (2010b), this result can be
traced back to the fact that the major channels through which inequality is predicted to negatively
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affect income growth (i.e. political instability, credit market imperfection, education differentials in
fertility and life-expectancy) are predominantly at work in developing countries.
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on education and growth by combing the two
directions and adding a third element. First, we continue along the lines of Lo´pez et al. (1998) in
computing reliable estimates of the macro economic return to education that account for the relevance
of its distribution among the population. Second, we follow Castello´-Climent (2010a and 2010b) in
assessing the overall effect of inequality in the distribution of human capital while controlling for
unobservable individual effects, dynamic panel bias as well as endogenous and persistent explanatory
variables. As opposed to the estimated direct negative relation between human capital inequality
and income growth, we presume the predominance of an indirect relation, which works through the
macro return to education. Thus, most importantly, we test whether the aggregate marginal benefit
to education varies with the position in the distribution of education. A straightforward approach for
dealing with heterogeneous coefficients is the inclusion of an interaction term between the distribution
and the average level of human capital.
4 The Data
We construct a panel dataset that contains information about real GDP per capita and variables
typically constituting its determinants in a neoclassical growth model, and include the average level
as well as the distribution of educational attainment. Data on real GDP per capita, capital stocks and
population growth are from the most recent release of Penn World Tables (PWT). PWT 8.0 provides
annual time series for 167 countries, overall ranging from 1950 to 2010. As it allows for comparing
the productive capacity over countries and over time, we use the output-side measure7 of real GDP at
chained PPPs (base=2005). Moreover, we compute the growth rate of capital stocks per capita using
a deflated measure of capital stock at current PPPs.
In order to estimate the degree of inequality in the distribution of human capital we apply the Gini
coefficient as a relative measure of dispersion to the distribution of educational attainment within a
concerned population, following the pioneering work by Lo´pez et al. (1998) and Fan et al. (2001) and
2002).8 The concept of the education Gini coefficient is similar to that of the widely used income
Gini, which is defined “...as the ratio to the mean of half of the average over all pairs of the absolute
deviations between (all possible pairs of) people.” (Deaton 1997 in Fan et al. 2001, 7). However,
data on the exact number of years of schooling are unavailable at the macro level, hence years of
education are inferred from the usual duration of formal schooling that is required for the highest
degree obtained. Formal education is, hence, a categorical rather than a continuous variable. It has
7While traditional measures have been based on prices of domestic absorption, the new output-side measure in PWT
8.0 additionally accounts for differences in export and import prices (see Feenstra et al., 2013). This measure permits
comparisons both across time and between countries, so that it is an ideal measure of GDP for our purposes.
8The method has been widely applied, e.g. by Castello´ & Dome´nech (2002), Checchi (2000), Castello´-Climent (2010a
and 2010b) and Castello´ & Dome´nech (2002 and 2008).
8
a lower boundary at zero years of schooling, accruing to people without any formal education, an
upper boundary, given by the cumulative duration of tertiary education and jumps corresponding to
transitions from one education level to another. For each country and time interval the education










|s˜i − s˜j | aiaj (1)
where s˜i and s˜j depict the cumulative years of formal schooling required to complete the respective
education level, indexed by i or j. ai and aj are the shares of the population for which level i/j is the
highest attained. µ are average years of schooling. Finally, the term NN−1 adjusts the Gini coefficient for
small population size. We take all necessary information from the most recent release of the Barro and
Lee (2013) schooling dataset.9 Accordingly, we consider seven categories of educational attainment10:
no schooling, incomplete and complete primary schooling, the first and second cycle of secondary
schooling, incomplete and complete higher education. The population shares and average years of
schooling refer to the population aged 15 years and over. The country and level specific duration of
formal schooling is derived from Barro and Lee (2013)11 figures of average years of schooling at each
level and the corresponding attainment data. The education Gini is thus the total difference in years
of schooling, weighted by population shares and standardized by the average years of schooling in the
population. According to (1) the education Gini lies in a range between 0 and 1, indicating perfect
equality and perfect inequality, respectively.
Through the combination of both data sources we derive an unbalanced panel12 consisting of
134 countries from 1950 to 2010 at five-year intervals. We estimate the model (see section 6) both
including and excluding the years affected by the 2007 financial crisis.13 We find that the fit of the
model that includes the financial crisis is slightly worse. This makes sense as the financial crisis has
hit developed economies much more strongly than developing economies. In order to avoid unwanted
distortions we have preferred to truncate our sample in 200514 and end up with 1313 GDP- and 1608
schooling-observations.15
Across the whole panel, the mean of average years of schooling and the education Gini coefficient
9Their methodological improvements (they exploit information from consistent census data, improved their estima-
tion technique for filling in missing observations and use new calculations of mortality rates by age and education as
well as estimates of completion ratios by age) address the concerns raised by Cohen & Soto (2007) and de la Fuente
& Dome´nech (2006) and should have significantly increased the quality of their educational attainment data. Barro &
Lee (2013) also extended the time and individual dimension and report attainment figures ranging from 1950 to 2010
in five-year intervals for the population aged 15 and over, disaggregated by sex and age.
10The classification scheme follows UNESCO’s International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED).
11Barro & Lee (2013) use data on the typical duration of primary and the two levels of secondary education for each
country from issues of the UNESCO Statistical Yearbook. For higher education a duration of four years is assumed for
all countries and for all years.
12The data are available from the authors upon request. Appendix A provides a list of countries included in our panel
dataset by region and reports when various parts of the world enter the dataset.
13The data for 2005 to 2010 have only been made available after the submission of the first draft.
14The results including observations up to 2010 are available from the authors upon request.
15We have also run our estimation excluding OPEC member countries. The estimated effects of schooling and the
distribution of human capital on economic performance differ only marginally. These results are available upon request
from the authors, too.
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is 5.62 and 0.46, respectively (see Table 1). The minimum and maximum values of the concerning
schooling variables indicate the existence of huge differences, not only between regions and countries,
but also over time. From Figure 1 it becomes evident that an overall trend of education expansion,
accompanied by a reduction of inequality in the distribution of education has taken place over the
period under study. While the distribution of average years of schooling across the sample has been
skewed to relatively low values in 1950, it is skewed towards educational achievement above ten years
in 2005. The distribution is, however, quite spread out and shows a second mode below five years of
schooling, indicating that huge differences across countries still persist. In contrast, the distribution
of the education Gini coefficient has narrowed and is concentrated at a relatively low value in 2005.
Countries have thus been converging in terms of their educational distribution.
Table 1 here.
Figure 1 here.
In 2005, across all 134 countries in the sample educational attainment averages were at 7.84 years
of schooling, with the respective value for the education Gini being 0.33 (see Table 1). Average years
of schooling range from 1.24 years in Mozambique to 12.91 in the United States. Education is most
evenly distributed (GE = 0.05) in the Czech Republic. By contrast, Niger reports the maximum
education Gini of 0.82, relating to 77 % of the population without any formal education. Indeed, high
shares of non-formally educated people coincide with high education Gini values. In all countries with
education Ginis greater than 0.5, at least half of the population did not attain any formal education.
South Asian and Sub-Saharan African countries are located at the upper left in the level-distribution
plane of Figure 2. They thus report, on average, the lowest level of schooling and the highest degree
of educational inequality in 2005. In contrast, Advanced Economies as well as European and Central
Asian countries, exhibiting high average educational attainment in conjunction with a low degree of
inequality, are located at the bottom right. The general shape of the relation between the average
level of and the degree of inequality in educational attainment within the remaining regions, reporting
medium values of years of schooling and the education Gini coefficient in 2005, is mainly driven by
highly-dynamic countries. The development of, for example, Iran in the Middle East, the Republic of
Korea in East Asia or Brazil in Latin America, was characterized by enormous educational expansion
and a a swift decline in educational inequality (see Figure 3). These countries thus feature values of
the two variables on schooling that span almost the whole plane.
Figure 2 here.
Even though the overall panel relation between years of schooling and the education Gini coefficient
remains negative, the slope varies with the location in the level-distribution plane. While it is negative
and steep above an education Gini of 0.5, it becomes successively flatter as the degree of inequality
decreases and the average level of educational attainment increases. It therefore matters at which level
of educational attainment one observes the relation between inequality and growth and, vice versa,
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at which degree of inequality one observes the effect of years of schooling on income growth. Most
importantly, however, the within variation differs across countries, even if their educational conditions
have been similar at the beginning of the sample period (see e.g. Niger and Iran in Figure 3). In
addition, the relation between average years of schooling and the education Gini coefficient within
countries over time does not need to be strictly negative. Clearly, in Figure (3), educational inequality
remained constant until 1990 in the Czech Republic. Thereafter, the distribution of educational
attainment gradually became more equal, as it did in the United States. In contrast, the degree of
educational inequality did not change significantly in the United Kingdom, while it increased in France
until 1985. Similar levels of average educational attainment therefore involve different compositions
of the educational structure, reflected in varying degrees of inequality. The analysis of the direct and
indirect growth effects of such variations in the educational Gini coefficient is, thus, what is of prime
interest for our work.
Figure 3 here.
5 Estimation Method
We investigate the relationship between income growth and the average level simultaneously with the
distribution of educational attainment by adopting an augmented version of a convergence specifica-
tion. This specification is derived from the closed form solution of the theoretical Solow model. In this
exogenous growth model, the rate of growth outside its long-run steady state depends on the current
level of output and its steady-state level. The steady state of output in turn depends on several
exogenous variables, such as the economy’s net investment rate in physical capital and population
growth. In an influential seminal paper, Mankiw et al. (1992) added the level of human capital16 as
an additional steady-state determinant. The previous theoretical considerations give strong indica-
tion that the steady state does not only depend on the level, but also on the distribution of human
capital. Specifically, theory implies that the education distribution affects the aggregate marginal
benefit to education as it has an impact on schooling quality and externalities. Our main econometric
specification is thus given by the following equations.
∆yi,t = γ1 ln(yi,t−τ ) + γ2∆ki,t + γ3∆ni,t + β1 ln(Si,t) + β2GEi,t + δIi,t + i,t (2)
i,t = ξt + ηi + νi,t (3)
The dependent variable, ∆yi,t = ln(yi,t) − ln(yi,t−τ ), is the growth rate of real GDP per capita in
country i over the time interval τ , i.e. 5 years. yi,t−τ is the corresponding level of real GDP per capita
of the preceding period t− τ , γ1; it thus captures the rate of convergence. Estimating equation (2) is
16In their main estimations of a static as well as dynamic augmented Solow model, Mankiw et al. (1992) use school
enrollment rates in order to proxy for human capital accumulation. The authors demonstrate, however, that their model
can alternatively be expressed in the level of human capital, resulting in different coefficients on saving and population
growth.
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actually equivalent to estimating an equation in the level of GDP per capita and controlling for the
lagged dependent variable. The coefficient γ1 would then, however, have a positive sign. We prefer
this specification for two reasons. In this version, we can directly test whether human capital has a
level effect on output, or whether it alters the rate of economic growth. If we cannot reject γ1 6= 0, the
impact of a change in human capital would be on the rate of growth, thus implying an endogenous
growth model (Lucas, 1988). Otherwise, the specification is identical to an exogenous growth model
predicting convergence conditional on the steady-state determinants. Thus, the null hypothesis for γ1
is a direct test whether economic growth is endogenous or not. Furthermore, should economic growth
be endogenous, it can no longer be theoretically ensured that GDP is stationary in first differences,
whereas the growth rate would remain stationary in first differences along a balanced growth path.
We further include ∆ni,t = ln(ni,t) − ln(ni,t−τ ), the population growth rate17, and ∆ki,t =
ln(ki,t) − ln(ki,t−τ ), the growth rate of capital stock per capita, as control variables. The com-
posite error i,t consists of vector of time dummies ξt, a time invariant country specific effect µi and
a remaining idiosyncratic error νi,t of country i in period t.
The three explanatory variables of prime interest are the level of human capital, measured as
the logarithm of average years of schooling ln(Si,t), its distribution, measured by the education Gini
coefficient GEi,t, and an interaction term Ii,t,
Ii,t = ln(Si,t) ∗GEi,t (4)
which is a non-linear function of Si,t and G
E
i,t and captures their combined growth effect. In case we
cannot reject δ = 0, (2) represents a simple additive specification where the coefficient on average
years of schooling β1 estimates the elasticity of the growth rate of real GDP per capita with respect
to Si,t across all levels of G
E
i,t. Vice versa, β2 estimates the change in GDP growth associated with a
one-unit change in GEi,t across all levels of ln(Si,t). Otherwise, the coefficient β1 in (2) estimates the
percentage change in GDP growth associated with a one-percentage change in Si,t when G
E
i,t is equal
to zero, with the reverse being true for β2. The coefficient on the interaction term δ measures either
the change in β1 associated with a one-unit change in the distribution of education or the change
in β2 associated with a one-unit change in logged average years of schooling. If δ is statistically
significant, the combined effect is relevant and can be deducted from (2) via conditional estimates,
i.e. the average effect of ln(Si,t) and G
E
i,t on GDP growth, conditional on particular levels of ln(Si,t)
and GEi,t, respectively.
Our general specification (2) nests several theoretical and empirical strands of literature, and we
will estimate those separately. First, the Mankiw et al. (1992) model can be retrieved from (2) by
setting β2 = δ = 0. Second, we can reproduce the estimation by Fan et al. (2001) by setting either
17Here, we deviate marginally from Mankiw et al. (1992) by using the population growth rate instead of warranted
growth, ln(∆ni,t + a + d), where a is the exogenous growth rate of technical progress and d the rate of depreciation.
Given a and d are constant, Mankiw et al. (1992) impose a nonlinearity in the estimator. In line with most of the
subsequent literature, we prefer a linear(ized) version of the estimator.
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β1 = δ = 0 or β2 = δ = 0 or just δ = 0. The latter case also resembles the estimation equation
employed by Castello´-Climent (2010a). However, the considerations in section 2 have given strong
indication for heterogeneity in the coefficients on the schooling variables. We have argued that the
impact of human capital is not uniform across educational systems that differ in their degree of
educational inequality. This makes the inclusion of the interaction term a first empirical test to this
literature. Theory also suggests that poor economies may transitionally benefit from an increase in
education inequality. Furthermore, the aggregate productivity of education and spillover effects, i.e.
the macroeconomic return to education, are predicted to be higher in more equal societies.
Note that we also have to distinguish between a mechanical and a behavioral relationship. High
and low average educational attainment is associated with low and high values of the education Gini
coefficient by construction. In between these extremes, however, we find within-country developments
to be heterogeneous. On the one hand, we have to control for the negative relationship. On the other
hand, the average level and the distribution of educational attainment are not collinear, so their effects
on growth can be separately identified (see discussion about Figure 3 in section 4).
In any specification of equation (2) we are estimating a dynamic model in real GDP per capita,
which allows for country-specific characteristics. Therefore, an appropriate estimation technique
should be able not only to deal with unobservable individual effects, but also with the dynamic panel
bias. That is, the lagged dependent variable is not only necessarily correlated with the country-specific
intercept, but also not strictly exogenous with respect to the time-varying error, i.e. cov(yi,t−τ , νt−τ ) 6=
0. Moreover, the issue of endogeneity also arises with respect to the explanatory variables of our inter-
est. For example, it is reasonable to assume the average level and the distribution of human capital to
be determined simultaneously with income. By having more means for investing in education in gen-
eral as well as for providing high quality public education, quickly growing and rich economies might
not only accumulate human capital, but would also aim at achieving a more equitable distribution
of educational attainment. This issue of reverse causality has already been subject to discussion on
theoretical as well as empirical grounds (e.g. Bils & Klenow, 2000).
In order to cope with these estimation problems we use the instrumental variable approach of the
system General Method of Moments (GMM),18 initially proposed by Arellano & Bover (1995) and
Blundell & Bond (1998). On the one hand, differencing eliminates unobservable individual effects. The
identifying assumption of lagged levels being orthogonal to the first difference of the time-varying error
enables to use them as internal instruments for the lagged dependent variable and other endogenous
regressors. On the other hand, the identifying assumption of lagged first differences being orthogonal
to the time-invariant error component makes them valid instruments in the levels equation. System
GMM then estimates a stacked system of equations in first differences and in levels, simultaneously.
We assume lagged GDP per capita to be predetermined so that yi,t−2τ and ∆yi,t−τ (and deeper lags)
18The sensitivity of the estimates to the method used for estimation is investigated by a comparison to fixed effects
and OLS estimates in appendix B.
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are available as instruments in the equation in first differences and the levels equation, respectively.
By contrast, treating population and capital-stock growth as well as average years of schooling and
the education Gini coefficient endogenous necessitates to go one further period back in order to obtain
valid instruments.
Consistency of system GMM crucially hinges on identifying assumptions securing the validity of
instruments, i.e. exogeneity of lagged levels and lagged differences in the first difference and the
levels equation, respectively. The assumption needed for instruments added by the levels equation
to be valid is not trivial, since it requires stationarity of the explanatory variables. This is secured,
however, by transforming data into deviations from period means by adding time dummies, as in
(2)19. Evaluating whether the identifying assumptions hold is essential. We therefore report two
specification tests. First, the Hanson test of over identifying restrictions tests the null hypothesis of
joint validity of the whole instrument set. Moreover, it has to be confirmed that the errors are serially
uncorrelated. The second test we perform is the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation, which aims
to detect first-order serial correlation in levels through testing for second-order serial correlation in
the residuals in differences.
The system GMM estimator generates a number of instruments that are quadratic in the time
dimension (T ). The instrument count can hence easily grow large relative to the sample size as T rises,
and may induce severe finite-sample problems. Typical for all instrumental variable techniques, too
many instruments can overfit endogenous variables, failing to expunge their endogenous components
and biasing coefficient estimates (Roodman, 2007). Moreover, the Hansen test statistic reveals that
overall the instruments validity becomes weak as instruments become numerous. In order to secure
reliability of estimation results, we limit the instrument set to the first available lag of predetermined
and endogenous variables, respectively.
6 Results
We estimate equation (2) in a dynamic panel over 55 years and 134 countries with a system GMM
estimator in order to explore the relationship between economic development, average educational
attainment and the degree of educational inequality.
Table 2 summarizes our regression results. We present four specifications. The first specification
reported in column (1) reproduces a conventional convergence specification, augmented with the level
of human capital (Mankiw et al., 1992). The second column replaces the log of schooling with the
Gini coefficient of educational attainment. In the third column, we include both the log of schooling
to approximate for average human capital and the education Gini in order to measure its distribution.
Finally, in the fourth column, we adopt the methodology presented in equation (2) and add an
19Yet, Roodman (2006) demonstrates this requirement to hold if initial deviations from a steady state of a series are
uncorrelated with the fixed effect, which is likely to be the case if a the starting point of a series lies far behind the
analyzed sample period. If so, stationarity would be assured even without time demeaning.
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interaction term between average years of schooling and the education Gini.
Table 2 here.
The middle panel of Table 2 reports specification tests peculiar to the system GMM estimator.
Limiting the instrument set to the first available lag of predetermined and endogenous variables,
respectively, enables us to ensure that the number of instruments falls below the number of observations
in each regression. Moreover, the Hansen test statistic reveals that overall instruments are valid in each
specification. Finally, p-values of the Arellano-Bond test allow for accepting the H0 of no second-order
serial correlation in first differences.
In all specifications the coefficient on lagged GDP per capita has the expected negative sign and is
statistically significant. Hence conditional convergence is confirmed to be relevant for the economies
building up our sample.20 Accordingly, countries with higher income exhibit lower growth rates, with
the corresponding elasticity ranging from -0.046 to -0.085. In accordance with theoretical predictions,
income and capital-stock growth are positively related at a substantial magnitude. An increase in
population growth curbs economic development. However, we can reject the null hypothesis of no
effect of population growth at the 5% significance level only in the first specification.
When estimating the marginal benefits to education without allowing for distributional aspects we
do not find the positive effect of average schooling to be statistically significant. In contrast, decreasing
the degree of educational inequality raises growth rates. That is, a reduction in the education Gini
coefficient by 0.1 (one standard deviation, equal to 0.22) increases five-year growth rates by 0.031%
(0.068%). With a semi-elasticity of -0.055 (-0.12), the effect of the education Gini is even larger if
average schooling is controlled for. However, due to the negative relation between the average level
and the distribution of schooling we suspect that the education Gini is absorbing the positive macro
return to education to the extent that it is not completely captured in ln(Si,t). Additional supportive
evidence for this presumtion is provided by the specification in column (4). Therein, we introduce the
proposed interaction term, thereby testing for heterogeneity in the effect of average schooling with
respect to the existing degree of inequality in the distribution of education and, at the same time,
for the dependence of the effect of the education Gini on the average level of educational attainment.
Allowing for this non-linearity turns out to be crucial, as the macroeconomic return to education turns
out to be statistically significant. Moreover, we find a strong and negative combined effect of the two
schooling variables. Thus, of particular interest are the conditional estimates, which we derive from
the interactive specification (2) as follows:
δS = β1 + δG
E
i,t (5)
δG = β2 + δ ln(Si,t) (6)
In order to test for the significance of conditional estimates, we compute conditional t-statistics
20Recent evidence by Young (2012) indicates that we may underestimate convergence, as economic growth rates in
poor countries, in particular in sub-Saharan Africa, may be higher than officially indicated.
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based on conditional standard errors which measure the variability of their associated coefficients at
particular levels of the respective variable (Friedrich, 1982). In order to get a sense of the significance
of these conditional estimates, the following policy experiments can be considered. First, δS gives
us the immediate effect of a one percent increase in human capital on economic growth, for a given
degree of inequality. Second, δG gives us the immediate effect on economic growth of switching from
a perfectly equal distribution of education to a perfectly unequal one, holding the average years of
schooling constant.
Results for the marginal benefit to education conditional on the degree of educational inequality
(δS) are presented in Figure 4, which includes both conditional estimates as well es the 10% confidence
interval. Accordingly, a one percent increase in average schooling boosts five-year growth rates by
0.535% if education is distributed perfectly equally, i.e. GEi,t = 0. However, with each increase of the
education Gini coefficient by one standard deviation, equal to 0.22, this positive effect is reduced by
0.09 percentage points. Thus, the effect diminishes substantially from an elasticity of 0.323 at the
lower bound, GE,Li,t = 0.16, given by the range of the education Gini which covers 90% of the data, to
0.22 at the sample median (GEi,t = 0.41). At the corresponding upper bound, where G
E,U
i,t = 0.9, the
marginal benefit to education is negligible and statistically insignificant. Overall, when the education
Gini is above 0.6, we can no longer reject the null hypothesis of no influence of human capital on
economic growth at the 10% significance level. This result demonstrates that, in general, average
educational attainment is relevant for economic development. However, education matters only if it
is not distributed unequally. Above an education Gini of 0.6 - or, for 29% of the data - an increase in
education does not have any impact on growth, as schooling quality is low and education then only
benefits a small elite. In contrast, the impact of education is stronger, the more equally education is
distributed in an economy.
Figure 4 here.
Figure 5 gives the conditional estimates of increasing educational inequality for given levels of
schooling. We find that for very low levels of education, the education Gini is positively related to
economic growth. At the lower bound, SLi,t = 0.8, given by the range of average schooling covered by
90% of the data, a one standard deviation deterioration of the Gini coefficient would increase five-year
growth rates by 0.138%. These positive estimates are statistically significant at the 10% level only
for average schooling below 0.7 years (4.3% of the sample). In contrast, above 10 years of schooling,
education inequality is significantly detrimental to income growth. At the corresponding upper bound,
where SUi,t = 10.68, an increase in the education Gini by one standard deviation reduces growth rates
by 0.095%.21
21Our result contrasts previous evidence from Castello´-Climent (2010a, 2010b), who finds income growth to be
negatively related to educational inequality in low- and middle-income countries, but insignificant in high income
countries. A possible reason for this disparity is that allowing the effect of inequality to depend on the level of educational
attainment enables to account for differences between countries, even within defined income groups. However, although
a positive relation is supported theoretically, it might be either driven by outliers or by the omission of the demographic
dimension of inequality. That is, fast educational expansion is associated with a swift increase in educational attainment
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Figure 5 here.
The coefficients presented in Table 2 only give us the short-run impact of changes in the education
system on economic growth. Given the dynamic linkages, these effects will be propagated into the
future, as an increase in the rate of growth in period one will lead to a higher GDP in period 2, which
in turns generates more growth in period two and so forth. With 0 < γ1 < 1, this propagation effect
will eventually taper off. We can calculate the overall long-run effect of a change in the independent
variables by dividing the coefficients estimated in equation (5) by −γ1. The conditional short-run
estimate for the effect of a one percent increase in human capital at the first quartile of the education
Gini in 2005 is δS = 0.39 − 0.41 ∗ 0.207 = 0.305. In the long run, this effect multiplies to δS−γ1 =
0.305/0.085 = 3.588. Thus, increasing human capital by one percent would lead to an increase in
GDP by 3.588% in the long run. At the third quartile of the education Gini in 2005, the conditional
immediate effect of δS = 0.39−0.41∗0.425 = 0.216 results in a long-run effect of 2.538%. In contrast,
at the third quartile of years of schooling in 2005 (9.86), an improvement in the education Gini by 0.1
entails a conditional growth effect of 0.04% and increases GDP per capita by 0.474% in the long run.
Putting this together, we can identify four country groups in our data, differing in the combined
effect of average education with its distribution22. First, in line with theoretical predictions, for
GEi,t > 0.6 and Si,t ≤ 0.7 one can deduce from our results that in countries with very low levels
of education, allocating educational resources to students at the top of the education distribution
would generate the most growth. Once the educated population passes a certain threshold, they will
contribute to a speedup in economic growth. However, among this 29% of the sample, including e.g.
Niger from 1950 to 1980 and in Iran in 1950 and 1955, with education Ginis averaging at 0.94, many
countries were near the maximum education Gini. These countries then began to move towards a more
equal distribution of education, while growth rates were highly erratic around zero. In the second
group of countries, where GEi,t > 0.6 and Si,t > 0.7, neither schooling effect is statistically significant.
Thus, e.g. in Niger from 1985 to 2005 and the Iran from 1960 to 1985, it would be beneficial to attain
a more equal distribution of education in order to enter into the third group. With GEi,t ≤ 0.6 and
0.7 < Si,t < 10, the third group includes 63% of the sample where a public base supporting investment
into schooling quality as well as positive (technological) education externalities and spillover effects
become stronger the more equal the distribution of education. Accordingly, e.g. in Brazil and the
Republic of Korea the macro return to education has been increasing throughout the whole sample
period. In contrast, increasing average attainment by one percent in the United Kingdom had the
same effect of 0.308% in 1950 as in 2005. Finally, if GEi,t ≤ 0.6 and Si,t ≥ 10, as e.g. in the Republic of
Korea from 1995 to 2005 and the United States from 1965 to 2005, it is possible to generate a growth-
enhancing effect of redistributing education which is additional to the marginal benefit to increasing
of the youth, while attainment of the elderly usually remains constant. The associated unequal distribution between
age cohorts, reflected in higher education Gini values, thus imply a positive growth effect. A consistent analysis of
educational inequality within and across age groups would, therefore, be an important aspect for further research.
22See Figure 3 for the example countries which follow.
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average schooling.
7 Education Inequality Regimes and Threshold Estimation
The main implication of the preceding analysis is that the macro return to education varies with
the position in the education distribution. In order to provide additional evidence on this relation,
we adopt a threshold effects estimation framework (see Shin, 2007 and Hansen, 1999). This method
enables us to statistically determine thresholds which divide the sample into regimes. In our case, the
threshold variable is the education Gini coefficient. For two regimes, the threshold model is given by
∆yi,t = φ1 ln(Si,t) ∗ 1(Gi,t < λ1) + φ2 ln(Si,t−τ ) ∗ 1(Gi,t ≥ λ1) + γXi,t + i,t (7)
where λ1 is the threshold value. Based upon specification (7), we test whether we are able to
recover the marginal benefits to education, φ1 and φ2, to be heterogeneous across inequality regimes.
In order to obtain an estimator of the threshold value, λˆ1, we impose a restriction that each regime
must contain at least 10% of the observations. In a system GMM context (Shin, 2007), model (7) is
then estimated for each value of education Gini coefficients ranging from 0.2 to 0.8 in steps of 0.05
and generalized minimum distance measures (GMDM) are obtained. A consistent estimator of λ1
is given by the threshold value which minimizes the GMDM. If one assumes that another threshold
value, λ2 < λ1 or λ2 > λ1, exists, λˆ1 is taken as given and λˆ2 is estimated in a similar manner, based
on the remaining range of education Gini coefficients. This basic procedure (and the corresponding
threshold model) can easily be extended to a higher amount of regimes, as long as the sample size
within each regime does not become too small.
Table 3 here.
Table 3 presents estimates we obtain from splitting our sample into two, three, or four regimes.
In column (1) the estimated threshold λˆ1 equals an education Gini coefficient of 0.25, but in both
regimes the return to education remains insignificant. In column (2) we obtain three regimes based
on two thresholds, λˆ1 = 0.25 and λˆ2 = 0.5. Below an education Gini of 0.5 the marginal benefit to
education is positive and lower for the higher inequality regime, above 0.5 it becomes insignificant.
Finally, three thresholds (λˆ1 = 0.25, λˆ2 = 0.55 and λˆ1 = 0.75) divide the sample into four regimes.
Again, the return to education is highest in the lowest inequality regime and slightly lower in the
second regime. It is further slightly negative in the third and insignificant in the fourth regime.
The coefficients on average schooling are jointly significant in the three as well as the four regimes
model. Moreover, a likelihood ratio test23 which enables to select between different threshold spec-
ifications allows us to identify four regimes to be best suited in order to model heterogeneity in the
macro return to education.
23Likelihood ratio tests on the existence of two, three or four regimes are based on the difference between generalized
minimum distance measures. That is, we compare the GMDMs of a specification without any threshold (see column
(1) in Table 2) and one threshold in order to test for the existence of one or two regimes, respectively. In doing so, we
are able to reject the H0 of no, one, two and three against the alternatives of two, three and four regimes.
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Figure 6 here.
In Figure 6, we present the estimated effect of average schooling conditional on education inequality
as it results from the three-regimes (solid lines) and the four-regimes (lighter lines) model, respectively.
We also show the boundaries of the confidence interval of the interactive specification, 4. The effect of
schooling on economic growth is insignificant for the third and fourth regimes in the three-regime and
the four-regime threshold regression. This is consistent with the continuous model, where the coeffi-
cient becomes insignificant for a Gini beyond 0.6. Below about 0.6, the lower the Gini, the stronger
the effect of schooling on economic growth, both in the threshold models and the continuous model.
The estimators of the threshold models fall on the lower bound of the continuous case estimation, but
are largely within the bounds of the confidence interval. The threshold model thus provides additional
evidence for the macro return to education to vary with the position in the education distribution.
Instead of jumping from one regime to another this heterogeneity seems, however, to be appropriately
modeled continuously, as it is performed by allowing for the interaction term.
8 Summary and Conclusions
Education obtained through the formal schooling cycle plays a fundamental role, not only for income
generation at the individual level, but also for equality of opportunities and economic development
at the macro level. The link between education and the aggregate stock of human capital is, how-
ever, not straightforward. It depends on schooling quality, externalities and spillovers, related to the
distribution of human capital within an economy. Theoretical approaches to economic growth that
account for distributional aspects generally predict the degree of human capital inequality to nega-
tively affect income growth through the channel of human capital accumulation. But, theory also
provides indication, not only for the effect to differ across countries according to the average level of
human capital but, most importantly, also for the macroeconomic return to education to vary with the
degree of education inequality. Our central hypothesis has therefore been that the aggregate benefit
to education depends on a country’s distribution of education. A specification of the real relationship
between average educational attainment, its distribution and economic development should thus allow
for a heterogeneous macroeconomic return to education and a non-linearity in the effect of educational
inequality.
Applying a system GMM estimator to a panel of 134 countries over 55 years from 1950 to 2005,
we have been able to recover the main results established in the empirical literature on education
inequality and economic growth. But we did not find evidence of a direct, negative effect of education
inequality, independent of other variables, notably the average level of schooling.
Accounting for heterogeneous coefficients by including an interaction term between the distribu-
tion - measured by the education Gini index - and the average level - measured by average years of
schooling - of human capital turned out to be crucial in understanding the relevance of educational
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attainment and inequality for economic development. We demonstrate, first, that the coefficient on
average schooling increases and becomes statistically significant as the appropriate functional form is
being estimated. Education thus exhibits a positive impact that is, however, substantially declining in
the degree of inequality in the education distribution. Accordingly, countries that show greater edu-
cational inequality experience lower macroeconomic returns to education than more equal economies,
on average. The robustness of this result is established by introducing a threshold model that tests
for the presence of education inequality regimes. Second, we find a slight transitional increase in
education inequality to be beneficial at a very low, but detrimental for growth at a relatively high,
average level of schooling. The effect is, however, statistically insignificant over the broad middle
range of schooling.
The conditional relationship between average educational attainment and income growth implies
that educational inequality has a negative, but indirect, effect on economic growth through a damp-
ening effect on the macroeconomic return to education. From this it follows, that the existence of
constraints to the equalization of marginal individual returns to education inhibits the aggregate pro-
ductivity of human capital. Moreover, consistent with evidence on schooling quality, high inequality in
the distribution of education constitutes a barrier to education expansion. As education becomes more
equally distributed, spillover effects of broadly educated communities predominate and determine the
scope of positive education externalities.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Average years of schooling Education Gini
region obs mean sd min max mean sd min max
Panel 1950-2005 1313 5.62 3.03 0.13 12.91 0.46 0.22 0.05 0.99
2005
Total 134 7.84 2.74 1.24 12.91 0.33 0.17 0.05 0.82
Advanced Economies 24 10.38 1.54 6.47 12.91 0.21 0.06 0.1 0.33
Europe and Central Asia 20 10.33 1.07 8.57 12.75 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.27
Latin America and Caribbean 21 8.04 1.41 3.99 9.71 0.3 0.09 0.12 0.53
East Asia and the Pacific 16 7.93 2.13 4.29 11.53 0.31 0.09 0.17 0.48
South Asia 6 5.62 2.61 3.41 10.8 0.47 0.14 0.2 0.59
Middle East and North Africa 15 7.22 2.27 2.98 11.28 0.4 0.15 0.2 0.73
Sub-Saharan Africa 32 4.91 2.01 1.24 9.13 0.51 0.17 0.21 0.82
Source: Barro & Lee (2013), own calculations. See Appendix A for a list of countries by region.
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Table 2: Regression results
∆yi,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(yi,t−τ ) -0.046 -0.062 -0.060 -0.085
(0.020)** (0.021)*** (0.019)*** (0.023)***
∆ki,t 0.399 0.395 0.434 0.469
(0.063)*** (0.060)*** (0.062)*** (0.056)***
∆ni,t -0.889 -0.527 -0.172 0.255
(0.342)** (0.391) (0.479) (0.526)
ln(Si,t) 0.043 -0.081 0.390
(0.036) (0.066) (0.170)**




Obs 1,179 1,179 1,179 1,179
N 134 134 134 134
T¯ 8.80 8.80 8.80 8.80
Inst 87.00 87.00 107.00 128.00
p(J) 0.03 0.04 0.15 0.23
p(ar1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
p(ar2) 0.23 0.18 0.18 0.18
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Time dummies are included for each 5-year time interval of the sample
period from 1950 to 2005. Instruments are the level and the first difference of GDP per capita lagged one period as
well as the level and the first difference of ∆ki,t, ∆ni,t, ln(Si,t) and Gi,t lagged two periods in the first difference
and the levels equation, respectively. The instrument set is restricted to the first lag available. T¯ is the average
number of time observations by country. p(J) is the p-value corresponding to the Hansen test for joint validity of
instruments. p(ar2) reports the p-value corresponding to the null of no second order serial correlation in first differences.
22
Table 3: Threshold model
∆yi,t
(1) (2) (3)
ln(yi,t−τ ) -0.051 -0.059 -0.064
(0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.021)***
∆ki,t 0.438 0.432 0.409
(0.065)*** (0.060)*** (0.055)***
∆ni,t -0.686 -0.178 0.329
(0.358)* (0.395) (0.447)
ln(Si,t)1 0.064 0.088 0.112
(0.040) (0.042)** (0.045)**






Obs 1,179 1,179 1,179
N 134 134 134
T¯ 8.80 8.80 8.80
Inst 107.00 127.00 147.00
p(J) 0.13 0.29 0.60
p(ar1) 0.00 0.00 0.00
p(ar2) 0.22 0.22 0.11
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. See notes of Table 2.
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Figure 6: Estimates of the effect of average schooling from the three-regimes (solid lines) and four-
regimes (lighter lines) specification
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A APPENDIX
Table A.1: Sample coverage by region
Advanced
Economies
1950-2005 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nor-
way, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
United Kingdom, United States
Europe and 1970-2005 Albania, Bulgaria, Poland
Central Asia 1990-2005 Armenia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Kaza-
khstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Ro-
mania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajik-
istan, Ukraine
East Asia and 1950-2005 Philippines, Thailand
the Pacific 1955-2005 China, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan
1960-2005 Fiji, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Singapore
1970-2005 Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Macao, Mongolia, Vietnam
South Asia 1950-2005 India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka
1960-2005 Bangladesh, Nepal
1970-2005 Maldives
Middle East and 1950-2005 Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Morocco
North Africa 1955-2005 Iran, Jordan, Malta
1960-2005 Syria, Tunisia
1970-2005 Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia
1990-2005 Yemen
Sub-Saharan Africa 1950-2005 Mauritius, South Africa, Uganda
1955-2005 Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe
1960-2005 Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African
Rep., Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Gam-
bia, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia,
Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo
1970-2005 Dem. Rep. Congo
Latin America and
the Caribbean
1950-2005 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Do-
minican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Trinidad & Tobago,
Uruguay, Venezuela





We present OLS and fixed effects (FE) estimates for our main results in tables B.1 and B.2. The
results are qualitatively similar to the GMM estimation, with a positive coefficient for the average
years of schooling and a negative coefficient on the interaction term, giving further evidence for the
robustness of our results. OLS and FE nicely reveal the pattern in the presence of dynamic panel
bias. The coefficients on the lagged dependent variable are biased upwards (towards zero) in OLS
estimation while they are strongly biased downwards when applying the fixed effects estimator. These
thus put a lower and upper bound to good estimates of the true parameter (also noted by Roodman,
2006).
Table B.1: OLS estimates
∆yi,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(yi,t−τ ) -0.027 -0.027 -0.027 -0.034
(0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)***
∆ki,t 0.465 0.466 0.466 0.470
(0.025)*** (0.025)*** (0.025)*** (0.025)***
∆ni,t -0.200 -0.095 -0.095 -0.023
(0.100)** (0.106) (0.109) (0.113)
ln(Si,t) 0.058 0.001 0.115
(0.013)*** (0.028) (0.055)**




R2 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
N 1,179 1,179 1,179 1,179
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parenthesis. Time dummies are included for each 5-year
time interval of the sample period from 1950 to 2005.
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Table B.2: Fixed effects estimates
∆yi,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(yi,t−τ ) -0.237 -0.226 -0.237 -0.249
(0.015)*** (0.016)*** (0.015)*** (0.016)***
∆ki,t 0.396 0.388 0.394 0.399
(0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.027)***
∆ni,t 0.319 0.196 0.337 0.401
(0.144)** (0.145) (0.145)** (0.146)***
ln(Si,t) -0.189 -0.214 0.092
(0.029)*** (0.040)*** (0.109)




R2 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.39
N 1,179 1,179 1,179 1,179
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parenthesis. Time dummies are included for each
5-year time interval of the sample period from 1950 to 2005.
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